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COMMENTS
Recovery for Increased. Risk of Disease in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCION
Within the last two years, two massive accidents involving the release of
hazardous chemicals have occurred in Louisiana. The first occurred on October
23, 1995, when a tank car "implosion," sent a massive pinkish-yellow cloud of
poisonous gas into the sky, forcing the evacuation of Bogalusa.' The gas that
wafted through the community was nitrogen tetroxide, and was "really, really bad
stuff," according to a state trooper.2
The second accident occurred on March 18, 1997, when a barge collided
with a bridge on the swollen Mississippi River.3 Hazardous chemicals, including
benzene, loomed over North Baton Rouge forcing the Mayor to declare an
emergency situation. This release also caused several evacuations, including the
evacuation of 1,200 Southern University students.
4
The effects of both accidents are likely to be felt not only in the communi-
ties affected, but also throughout courts in Louisiana in the years to come. This
is because victims of the releases are likely to bring traditional tort claims against
the allegedly responsible parties along with not so traditional claims, such as
cancerphobia,medical monitoring, and increased risk of disease. These emerging
claims are the subject of this comment.
In spite of the fact that increased risk claims are not new to Louisiana, the
courts have yet to enunciate any definite standards for their application. This
comment will attempt to rectify this situation by identifying and explaining these
claims, as well as analyze the purposes and policies for and against implementing
these causes of action. Sections II and III will attempt to define increased risk,
determine the problems in awarding damages for these injuries, and present
potential solutions from other jurisdictions to these problems. Sections V and VI
will examine cases applying Louisiana law that have dealt with increased risk
and determine what potential solutions might apply in this State.
I. WHAT IS INCREASED RISK?
In a traditional negligence analysis,' a tortfeasor who fails to exercise
reasonable care and causes damage to another person is typically liable in tort.'
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
1. Tank Car Implosion Forces Evacuations, The Advocate (Baton Rouge), Oct. 24, 1995, at
I-A.
2. Id.
3. Southern Relocates Students to Field House, The Daily Reveille (Louisiana State
University), Mar. 19, 1997, at I.
4. Id.
5. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 La. L. Rev. 1509
(1993).
6. Sometimes a duty may not be owed to a particular person. See generally Galligan, supra
note 5.
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For example, a knife juggler enjoys practicing his skill in crowded rooms. On
an unfortunate occasion the juggler misses a knife, injuring a bystander.
Applying a traditional negligence analysis, the knife juggler is liable for failing
to exercise reasonable care by not keeping a reasonable distance between himself
and the bystander or not being skilled in his practice. However, if the juggler
did not cause injury to anyone during his act, he will not be liable.! Even
though the juggler increased the risk of everyone in the room of being cut during
his act, the juggler will not be liable as long as he did not cut anyone.
Therefore, in a traditional tort analysis, when the risk-creating behavior ceases,
so does the possibility of committing a tort.'
A latent injury or increased risk case reveals some limitations of the
traditional tort analysis. Increased risk is a claim for damages resulting from
negligent conduct that is proven likely to lead to future damage that has not yet
manifested.9 Using the hypothetical above, suppose the knife juggler misses and
the knife sticks into a bystander, and upon removal, the tip of the knife breaks
off in such a way that it is positioned near a crucial nerve and cannot be
removed. Furthermore, it is proved that the bystander has a "chance" to become
paralyzed if the knife tip happens to shift, even though the original wound will
completely heal.' ° In a lawsuit, the bystander will probably seek damages not
only for the original "stick," but also for the "chance" that he will become
paralyzed. This "chance" of becoming paralyzed is the increased risk of future
damage. Although the risk-creating behavior has ceased, the potential for
damage has not."
III. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOWING RECOVERY FOR AN INCREASED
RISK
Courts have problems with allowing recovery for an increased risk in a
traditional tort analysis. For example, in the second knife juggler hypothetical,
should the bystander be allowed to recover for the possibility or probability that
he may become paralyzed? If recovery is allowed, how much should be
awarded-full recovery for paralysis--or a reduced amount? If recovery is not
allowed, must the plaintiff wait until the paralysis occurs? Then what about
prescription?
In the toxic tort arena, the usual complications are compounded because the
risk-creating thing is not a knife tip that can be seen in x-rays; instead, it is
invisible carcinogenic material that has entered the human body. Moreover,
7. This assumes that there are not any mental anguish issues.
8. Barton C. Legum, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 563,
564-65 (1984).
9. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 304 (NJ. 1987).
10. This hypothetical is based on Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1982). Instead of a knife tip the object was a bullet.
11. See Legum, supra note 8, at 566.
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some experts agree that even though the carcinogenic material is not visible to
the naked eye, the risk can be just as real as a knife tip.12
Taking all of these difficulties into account, one may ask why allow
recovery for an increased risk. The answer is that allowing recovery for
increased risk satisfies more of the basic policies in tort law than waiting until
the disease develops. For instance, in a typical increased risk case, damages do
not manifest themselves for several years after the original exposure or injury.
This lapse between the initial exposure and damage causes the following
problems in trying to promote traditional tort policies."
First, "the 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm" will not occur if
a plaintiff waits to sue. 4 Those who have not experienced harm may not
receive a warning of the potential danger. Moreover, a tortfeasor could mitigate
future damages by being responsible for the costs of monitoring the plaintiff's
medical status.".
Second, the policy of admonishing the wrongdoer or deterring the wrongful
behavior cannot always be achieved if a plaintiff must wait until the damage
develops.' 6 Because of the great lapse in time, defendants may become
bankrupt, die, or disappear. In addition, the break in time allows the wrongdoer
to continue the culpable conduct without recourse.
Finally, the overriding policy in tort law of compensating the injured is not
always achieved if the cause of action accrues only when the disease develops. 7
As above, defendants may become insolvent during the lapse, leaving unwary
plaintiffs to discover insidious diseases years later.
Claims for damage due to an increased risk have the potential to solve all
of these problems because they allow the plaintiff to sue shortly after exposure,
decreasing the lapse of time between the initial wrongdoing and the suit.
Although the application of increased risk may help solve policy problems
associated with tort law, fitting the cause of action into the defined parameters
of common-law tort law is an extraordinary feat. Nevertheless, because
traditional tort law is typically the only current avenue for these claims, courts
adjudicating these claims encounter three major problems when facing increased
risk cases: causation, claim preclusion, and prescription.'
12. See Peter G. Shields & Curtis C. Harris, Molecular Epidemiology and the Genetics of
Environmental Cancer, 266 JAMA 681, 682 (1991).
13. The major purposes of tort law are to: (1) provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights
of parties who might otherwise "take the law into their own hands"; (2) deter wrongful conduct; (3)
encourage socially responsible behavior; and (4) compensate injured parties. David P. C. Ashton,
Comment, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claims for Increased Risk of Future Disease, 43 U.
Miami L Rev. 1081, 1092 (1989) (citing William L. Prosser et al., Cases and Materials on Torts I
(8th ed. 1988)).
14. W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 4, at 25 (5th ed. 1984).
15. See infra notes 101-121 and accompanying text.
16. Keeton et al., supra note 14, §.4, at 25.
17. Id. at 20.




The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a plaintiff must establish the
existence of an injury, along with other elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. 9 In a toxic tort increased risk case, proving that exposure to a toxic
substance will proximately cause a disease by a preponderance of the evidence
is almost impossible.20
The traditional proximate cause inquiry is generally a two-step analysis.2'
First, is the cause-in-fact or "but for" determination. The general hypothetical
question, "'but for' the 'cause,' would the 'effect' have occurred," is usually
asked to determine if the alleged cause is connected to the alleged effect.22 If
this question is answered in the negative or if it is determined that the accident
would have happened regardless of the alleged cause, then the entire analysis
should terminate. This is because this question is a necessary predicate to our
next determination, legal or -proximate cause.23
If the alleged cause is found to be a cause-in-fact, then a determination must
be made to see if society ought to attribute liability to that particular cause-in-
fact. This is the legal cause question, and is usually based on policy.' An
illustration of the differences between legal cause and cause-in-fact is the "chain
of causal links" metaphor." A cause-in-fact is any link in the causal chain, and
the legal cause is a link located close enough to the effect for legal purposes.2 6
The primary difficulty in determining causation in toxic torts is the cause-in-
fact analysis. Plaintiffs must prove that "but for" exposure to a particular
hazardous substance, their particular disease would not have developed. Due to
the current inchoate understanding of diseases and the lack of precise evidence,
Context of Exposure to Hazardous Substances?, 76 Ky. L.J. 459 (1987).
19. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 328A cmt. a (1965).
20. Some commentators have called the increased risk cause of action itself a "phantom
remedy" because of the difficulty of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ashton.
supra note 13, at 1083-84. See also William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for
Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 859 (1981).
21. In Louisiana, the duty-risk approach to negligence is used to determine liability. Although
oversimplified, the major difference between the duty-risk approach and the traditional negligence
formula as to causation is who gets to determine the legal cause question. In the traditional
negligence formula the jury gets to decide the question of legal cause, and under duty-risk that
question is left for the judge. Galligan, supra note 5, at 1527.
22. Bert Black, Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 1, 7 (1993).
23. After determining that there was not a "but for" causal connection, some courts have
applied the "substantial factor" test to determine cause-in-fact See Galligan, supra note 5, at 1512.
Commentators have criticized the "substantial factor test because it is a lesser standard than the "but
for" test, and allows policy decisions to cloud the factual determination of cause-in-fact. Black,
supra note 22, at 2. See also Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "'Legal Cause" at
Common Law, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 16 (1909).
24. Galligan, supra note 5, at 1513.




"but for" causation is difficult to prove in toxic exposure cases.2 Nevertheless,
plaintiffs attempt to draw the causal link by using epidemiological studies, and
other scientific tools.2" For example, the rate of a certain type of cancer in a
population not exposed to a hazardous substance generated by the defendant is
10 cases per 100,000. In addition, an epidemiological study shows that the
population of which the plaintiff is a member has a cancer rate of 15 cases per
100,000 of the certain cancer, which is caused by the hazardous substance.29
Because the epidemiological evidence only shows an increase of 5 cases of
cancer per 100,000, the plaintiff will have a difficult time in proving that the
hazardous substance was a "but for" cause of his cancer.30 Needless to say,
such an extension of the cause-in-fact analysis would severely attenuate the
causal chain.3'
The reason courts use the "but for" standard of causation is to minimize the
possibility of over or under-compensation.32 If a lesser standard is used, the
27. Ashton, supra note 13, at 1083-84. In toxic tort cases, plaintiffs and defendants can "rarely
introduce 'particularistic' evidence which directly addresses the issue of causation in the individual
case." Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and
Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale L.J. 376, 384 (1986).
28. The purpose of an epidemiological study is to establish associations between alleged causes
and effects by one of two methods: "either comparing the incidence of disease across exposed and
unexposed populations, or comparing the incidence of exposure across sick and healthy populations."
Gold, supra note 27, at 380. Other tools that scientists use to prove cause-in-fact are animal studies
and tissue samples. Although animal studies are useful, they usually involve much higher doses of
the substance over a shorter period of time, causing difficulties in extrapolating to low doses over
prolonged periods. The question of extrapolation between species is also a problem. Daniel A.
Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1228 (1987).
29. Peter S. Mendal & Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy 753-54 (1994)
(discussing a similar approach).
30. This particular epidemiological study only establishes a one-third probability that any given
individual's cancer was caused by exposure to the defendant's hazardous substance. Id. at 754.
31. In an individual case, such as this example, "epidemiology cannot conclusively prove
causation" for the future damage. It can only establish "a certain probability that a randomly selected
case of disease was one that would not have occurred absent exposure." Gold, supra note 27, at 380.
Furthermore, even in a class action, it is still difficult to prove that a particular substance caused a
particular disease in a particular plaintiff by only using statistical evidence. Farber, supra note 28,
at 1128.
32. Some courts in determining cause-in-fact have misused the "substantial factor" test. Black,
supra note 22. at 9. For example, in Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817, 110 S. Ct. 69 (1989), the court used a "substantial factor" as the standard
for cause-in-fact. In Elam, the plaintiffs were suffering a variety of ailments. Id. at 47. They sued
for damages reportedly resulting from emissions from a plant. Id. In a misapplication of the law,
the court of appeals, in affirming the trial court, said:
[A]lthough our law requires proof of cause to recover in tort, it does not require proof
of a single cause. The substantial factor standard-which ascribes liability to a cause
which has played an important part in the production of the harm, even though the harm
may have occurred absent that cause-is particularly suited to injury from chronic
exposure to toxic chemicals where the [subisequent manifestation of biological disease
may be the result of a confluence of causes.
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chances will increase that courts will hold defendants responsible who were not
a cause of the damage, as well as award damages for injuries that may never
develop.3 Furthermore, a lower standard has the potential to "open the
floodgates" of litigation.34 As it now stands in almost all jurisdictions, if the
"but for" standard of causation is not met in an increased risk of disease case,
recovery will be denied." On the contrary, some commentators advocate that
applying the "but for" standard to determine cause-in-fact in toxic tort cases is
arbitrary because the evidence is merely based on scientific probabilities. 6
Id. at 174 (emphasis added). The court is partially correct in saying that a single cause does not need
to be proved in a case; however, the correct standard of causation is "but for" not "substantial
factor." See Black, supra note 22, at 9. The "substantial factor" test, as described in the
Restatement, is usually only applied in situations where there are two causes, "either of which could
have caused the event alone, and it cannot be determined which was the actual cause." Herskovits
v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474,489 (Wa. 1983) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a) (1965). For example, suppose two hunters fire their
rifles simultaneously and negligently, and both bullets strike another person in the heart, each hunter
could claim his shot caused no harm because the victim would have died anyway. Black, supra note
22, at 4. However, the Restatement guides us to ask, would either hunter's shot been fatal by itself;
and, if the answer is "yes" then it could be said that either hunter was a cause-in-fact because his shot
was a substantial factor in killing the person. Black, supra note 22, at 4-5. Therefore, the "but for"
determination should not be abandoned, only modified to ask, "but for" the alleged cause itsef,
would the effect have occurred. Id. at 6. In the Elam case, the court skipped the "but for"
determination, and jumped directly into the proximate cause question. The court should have applied
a "but for" analysis to determine if the alleged causes were the cause-in-fact of the ailments, then
determine if the single cause (i.e., the emissions from the plant) proximately caused the ailments.
Nevertheless, another explanation for what the Elam court may have been doing is that it was making
a policy determination of who should pay for the damages rather than determining liability. Black,
supra note 22, at 10.
33. Some commentators have noted that the traditional standard of causation has been collapsed
into the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of persuasion in toxic tort cases. Gold, supra note
27, at 378. This new test of causation can be expressed by the question: "Does the factual
probability of causation exceed 50o?" Id. The collapse of the cause-in-fact and burden of
persuasion results in a loss of distinction between the two. Id.
34. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307-08.
35. There are several different standards of causation that jurisdictions currently use:
reasonably certain, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d I 188 (6th Cir.), reh 'g and reh 'g
en banc denied, (1988) (applying Tenn. law); reasonably probable, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying La. law); more probable than not, e.g., Hagerty
v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.), modified on denial of reh g en banc, 797 F.2d
256 (1986) (Jones Act); and others. See David C. Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or
Condition or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as Element of Recovery, 50 ALR 4th 13, §§ 43-48 (1986).
Although the standards seem to differ, the majority appears to require that the plaintiff prove an
increased risk greater than fifty percent. Ashton, supra note 13, at 1103. Because of the harshness
of the "but for" test, some alternative tests have been established to prove cause-in-fact: substantial
factor (see supra note 32), alternative liability (see Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (Ca. 1948)), and
market share liability (see Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Ca.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912,
101 S. Ct. 285 (1980)).
36. Legum, supra note 8, at 568. "it is as if courts are finding that 40% of all tickets in a
lottery are absolutely worthless while 60% of the tickets are worth the entire prize." Id. This shows
the problem with the all-or-nothing rule of damages. If the plaintiff proves the alleged future damage
(V/ol. 58
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Two of the best known cases displaying the problems with causation are
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp." and Ayers v. Township of Jackson.3" In
Sterling, Velsicol deposited 300,000 fifty-five-gallon drums over the course of
ten years, "containing ultrahazardous liquid chemical waste and hundreds of
fiberboard cartons containing ultrahazardous dry chemical waste" in a landfill
near the plaintiff's aquifer.3 9 This activity led to the pollution of the plaintiff's
drinking wells. In the suit, the plaintiffs sought to recover, among other things,
damages for the increased risk of developing cancer in the future as a result of
consuming the polluted water."'
The district court found that some of the plaintiffs had an increased risk of
twenty-five to thirty percent that they would develop a disease.4 The court
held the increased risk was enough to award damages." Nevertheless, the court
of appeals stated that a twenty-five to thirty percent chance "does not constitute
a reasonable medical certainty, but rather a mere possibility or speculation." 3
Because Tennessee law requires that future harm must be proved by a reasonable
medical certainty, recovery for the disease and the increased risk of the disease
was denied, and the Sixth Circuit thus reversed on this issue."
In Ayers, the defendant was a township that owned and operated a landfill
that polluted the plaintiff's aquifer. Increased risk of disease was one of the
many causes of action averred by the plaintiffs. The testimony established that
chemicals from the landfill posed potential harms to the plaintiffs. Furthermore,
the defendant did not dispute the causal relationship between the plaintiffs'
exposure and their increased risk. The township did contend, however, that "the
probability that plaintiffs will actually become ill from their exposure to
chemicals is too remote to warrant compensation under the principles of tort
law."4 ' The court agreed with the defendant and did not allow recovery for
future diseases."
In both Serling and Ayers, it was undisputed that the plaintiffs had an
increased risk of developing cancer in the future, but the courts denied recovery
by the jurisdiction's standard of proof, then the damage will be treated as a certainty. Ashton, supra
note 13, at 1088. However, if the plaintiff fails to meet this standard, then the damage will be treated
as nonexistent Id. "Hence, depending upon whether one can satisfy the standard of proof, one
recovers all or nothing." Id.
37. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.), reh"g and reh "g en banc denied, (1988).
38. 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987).
39. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1192.
40. The water was proven to contain carbon tetrachloride and chloroform; both known
carcinogens. Id. at 1198.
41. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp 303, 437 (1987).
42. Id. at 322.
43. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205.
44. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Young, 362 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1962).
45. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 304 (N.J. 1987).
46. The court did allow recovery for medical monitoring. ld. at 310. See also Infra notes 101-
121 and accompanying text
1997]
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because the causal links were too attenuated between the negligent conduct and
the future disease.
B. Claim Preclusion and Prescription
In a traditional tort case, a plaintiff may only sue once for injuries arising
from the same event.47 Thus, the plaintiff must sue for all of past, present, and
future damages arising out of the same transaction or occurrence."' If the
plaintiff brings a second action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
as the first, the doctrine of res judicata will bar the second action because all of
his rights against that defendant were merged into the first action.49
In a latent injury case, several theories for recovery may be alleged, but the
plaintiff must aver them all in one suit. For example, in the knife juggler
hypothetical, suppose the bystander sues for the injuries arising out of the
original injury, the initial "stick." After obtaining a judgment against the
negligent juggler, the bystander continues to live without complications from the
knife tip for several years. However, on an unfortunate day, the knife tip shifts,
severing the bystander's spinal cord-causing paralysis. In this example, the
single cause of action rule will preclude any claim the bystander has against thejuggler for the paralysis, since both injuries (the "stick" and paralysis) arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence.
The problems of the single-cause-of-action rule in a latent injury case are
compounded with the application of prescriptive periods. For instance, in
Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co.," the plaintiff was exposed to a toxic
substance. When the exposure occurred, the plaintiff lost "consciousness, and
experience[d] severe headaches.""1 The exposure led to other severe mental
damage years later. Because the plaintiff did not sue within the prescriptive
period triggered by the loss of consciousness and headaches, his claim was
barred. Furthermore, if the plaintiff in Albertson sued to recover for the
headaches and loss of consciousness within the prescriptive period, then res
judicata would bar a subsequent claim for damage arising out of the exposures,
as in the knife juggler hypothetical above. Nonetheless, if the plaintiff sues for
the increased risk within the prescriptive period, as well as the incidental claims,
then he will encounter the causation problems in proving the increased risk
beyond a preponderance of the evidence.
47. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). See also Albertson v. T.i. Stevenson &
Co., 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984).
48. "One injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from the other for all
harm, past, present, and prospective, legally caused by the tort." Restatement (Second) of Torts §
910 (1977). This is known as the "single controversy rule" or the "rule of merger." See Ayers, 525
A.2d at 300; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 910 (1977).
49. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 910 cmL. d (1977).
50. 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 227.
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The previous example is a great illustration of the "Catch 22" situation
plaintiffs find themselves in when confronted with a latent disease or increased
risk case. If a plaintiff waits until he develops a disease to sue, he or she may
lose all of his or her causes of action because a traumatic event or other injury
may have occurred during exposure that triggered prescription. However,
because the plaintiff may only sue once for the same transaction or occurrence,
if he or she sues within the prescriptive period for the incidental damages due to
exposure, res judicata will bar a subsequent suit for a disease. Even an incidental
nonphysical injury, such as cancerphobia, 2 may be enough to trigger prescrip-
tion. 3 Thus, potential plaintiffs may lose their cause of action to prescription
if they wait for the latent disease to develop.
lII. JURISPRUDENTIAL ATrEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS WITH
. INCREASED RISK CASES
During the last decade, commentators, courts, and legislatures have attempted
to develop solutions to the problems associated with applying increased risk in
a traditional tort system using basic notions of cause-in-fact. In searching for
solutions, two approaches have generally been followed. The first approach is
a simple "tinkering" with the traditional tort rules, and the concession of certain
specific exceptions for victims of latent injuries." These exceptions are known
as the discovery rule and splitting the cause of action.
The second approach consists of redefining the injuries suffered by the
victims of latent injuries. Although some commentators deem this approach to
be radical in design, it attempts to solve the most difficult problem: causa-
tion. s While they may have different labels, these theories can be generally
categorized as the fear of future disease, medical monitoring, and increased risk
as the harm itself.5 6 In some jurisdictions these approaches are combined.
A. The Discovery Rule
Thediscovery rule delays the commencement of prescriptive periods until
the plaintiff discovers or should discover an injury. 7  Due to the insidious
52. See infra note 79.
53. See Smith v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 So. 2d 325 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 641 So. 2d
207 (1994).
54. Ashton, supra note 13, at 1085.
55. See Melissa M. Thompson, Conment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting
Recovery to Compensation for Loss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 453 (1994); J. Joseph Reina,
Recovery for Fear of Cancer and Increased Risk of Cancer: Problems with Gideon and a Proposed
Solution, 7 Rev. Litig. 39 (1987).
56. Tamsen Love, SPECIAL PROJECT. Environmental Reform in an Era of Political
Discontent: Deterring Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Substances: The Case for Legislative
Recognition of Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 789, 804 (1996).
57. See Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
1997]
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nature of diseases resulting from exposure to hazardous substances, 8 the
discovery rule seems to be a solution to the uncertainty of whether or not the
plaintiff will develop cancer.59 Ideally, the discovery rule will suspend the
prescriptive period until the plaintiff knows or should know of the existence of
a disease. Only then will the plaintiff be able to aver a cause of action.
In practice, the main problem with the discovery rule is determining when
the plaintiff knew or should have known when an injury occurs to "trigger"
prescription. If the injury is sub-cellular damage of chromosomes or DNA, and
the plaintiff has knowledge of the exposure, then prescription begins to run at
exposure; and the discovery rule will not suspend prescription.'e Moreover, if
the exposure is accompanied by physical damage, once again the discovery rule
will not help to suspend prescription." If the "injury" occurs when the plaintiff
develops the latent disease, then the discovery rule will work as intended.
There are, however, other problems with applying the discovery rule. Even
though waiting for the disease to develop takes away the uncertainty of whether
or not it will occur, it also creates a gap in time. This lapse in time may cause
problems.6" First, not only are people surrounded by potential cancer-causing
substances every day,'3 but certain individuals may also have a genetic
propensity toward developing disease." These facts, may "muddy the waters"
of causation over time, leaving factfinders to guess whether it was the exposure
to the toxic substance that caused the disease or something else. Second,
evidence, such as witnesses' testimony and documents may be harder or
impossible to obtain after a lengthy gap in time."5 Witnesses may either
become unavailable, or when available may not remember. Last, many things
could have occurred in this gap in time, including the possibility that a tortfeasor
may have become bankrupt or died, leaving the plaintiff uncompensated."
58. Sometimes 10 or more years. See Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of
Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1683 (1983).
59. Congress seemed to think so as well when it passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act The act included a provision that tolled all state
prescriptive periods whenever a victim is exposed to "any hazardous substance, or pollutant or
contaminant, released into the environment from a facility" until "the plaintiff knew (or reasonably
should have known)" of the injury. 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (1995).
60. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984). In Brafford, the
court discusses the difficulty in determining if sub-cellular injury is a present injury. Id. at 17-18.
61. As in Albertson v. TJ. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Hagerty
v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
62. See Love, supra note 56, at 802-03.
63. See, e.g., Frederica P. Perera, Molecular Epidemiology: Insights Into Cancer Susceptibility,
Risk Assessment, and Prevention, 88 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 496-509 (1996).
64. See. e.g., Grahm A. Colditz et. al., Risk Factors For Breast Cancer According to Family
History of Breast Cancer, 88 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 365-71 (1996) (This study evinces a consistent
increase in risk of breast cancer among women with a mother or sister history of the disease that was
further exacerbated by first pregnancy.).




B. Splitting the Cause of Action
Many courts and legislatures have proposed or actually allowed a relaxation
of the merger rule. 7 This relaxationallows a plaintiff to have two independent
actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, "one for the present
injury and one that does not accrue until the latent disease occurs."'  The
purpose of splitting the cause of action is simply to circumvent the problem of
claim preclusion in latent disease cases in jurisdictions with the discovery rule.
Courts allowing a plaintiff to split a cause of action have generally stated the
"onset of cancer, its extent and the amount of damages are too speculative to be
decided" in an increased risk case.69 Splitting a cause of action, in these courts'
opinions, will allow a sense of certainty in calculating damages. Thus, splitting
the cause of action will not force the plaintiff to choose between suing right
away on incidental causes of action and losing the cancer claim due to claim
preclusion, or waiting until the disease develops and most likely being barred due
to prescription. The result is that the plaintiff would be able to recover fully for
not only his past and present damages, but also future damages if and when they
develop. For example, using the knife juggling hypothetical, the bystander will
be able to sue for his current damages from the knife "stick" right away. Later,
if the knife tip causes him any other problems, he can sue again, even though it
arose out of the original incident.
Two cases that have used the split cause of action are Devlin v. Johns-
Manville Corp." and Wilson v. Johns-Manville Corp.7 Because they were
suffering from asbestosis, the plaintiffs in Devlin sought to recover damages for
increased risk, fear of cancer, as well as other claims. Acknowledging that their
experts could not state that they would develop cancer in the future by a
reasonable medical probability, the plaintiffs conceded that they could not prevail
on a claim for prospective cancer at this time.72 However, when discussing
whether or not any subsequent claims for cancer would be precluded, the court,
citing the Restatement (Second) of Judgments," reserved the right to allow the
67. See. e.g., infra note 73 and accompanying text.
68. Ashton, supra note 13, at 1092. See also Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1219, 1231-32 (D. Mass. 1986); Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-26 (Fla. 3d
Dist. CL App. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (1986).
69. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986).
70. 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. 1985).
71. 684 F.2d III (D.C. Cir. 1982).
72. A reasonable medical probability is the standard of proof in New Jersey. Devlin, 495 A.2d
at 500. It is Cuivalent to preponderance of the evidence. See Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481 (N.J.
1959).
73. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) provides some exceptions to the single
cause of action rule. The exceptions applicable to increased risk cases are:
(b). The court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiffs right to maintain the
second action or;
(f) It is clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring preclusion of a second
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plaintiff to sue for cancer at a later date, and noted, "[t]he simple fact is that at
this time there is no cause of action presently existing either for the increased
risk of cancer or for cancer itself."'
Wilson involved a wrongful death action brought by a widow of an
employee of an asbestos manufacturer. As an insulation worker for many years,
Wilson was exposed to asbestos and asbestos products during his employment.
In 1973, he was diagnosed with asbestosis. After this diagnosis, his health
deteriorated due to his disease, which in turn ultimately lead to cancer and his
subsequent death in 1978. The issue was whether an asbestos-related disease
triggered prescription for all causes of action arising out of exposure. The
defendants argued that the initial diagnosis of asbestosis triggered prescription on
all potential diseases caused by the exposure to asbestos. Consequently, the
defendants claimed that because the three-year prescriptive period had run, the
survival action and wrongful death claims were prescribed. In an opinion written
by then-Judge Ginsburg, the court held that prescription was not triggered for all
causes of action arising out of the exposure.7" In brief, the court treated each
distinct illness as a separate cause of action, allowing their potential actions
caused by the same occurrence to be split. The court held, "[o]ur consideration
of this appeal persuades us that a model or rule acceptable for more common
personal injury actions may not be appropriate in latent disease cases."76
Both the Devlin and Wilson courts looked at the policies of double recovery
and judicial efficiency behind the single-cause-of-action rule in making their
decision. The courts then balanced these policies with the plaintiffs right to
compensation and the fact that causation in an increased risk claim is difficult to
prove, and concluded that the policies behind the single-cause-of-action rule do
not apply in latent disease cases. 77
There are, however, some problems with allowing a split cause of action.
As with the discovery rule, the delay caused by the latent period of the disease
would cause a gap in time. This gap, as with the discovery rule, will cause
problems in proving causation, finding evidence, as well as the possibility that
a defendant may have become judgment-proof."
C. Fear of Future Disease
The fear of future disease and cancerphobia are simply specific types of
emotional distress or mental anguish actions arising out of exposure to toxic
action are overcome for an extraordinary reason.
Id. § 26.
74. Devlin, 495 A.2d at 502.
75, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 684 F.2d I11, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
76. Id.
77. Devlln, 495 A.2d at 502; Wilson, 684 F.2d at 120.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
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substances. 9 Consequently, the development of fear of disease is similar to that
of emotional distress. For example, with emotional distress claims, courts
initially feared a flood of litigation because of the difficulty in determining if
claims were-genuine." Therefore, a physical impact or injury rule was adopted
in order to curb fraudulent claims."' Similarly, some courts recognizing fear
of disease claims have also adopted a physical impact or injury rule as a
prerequisite to recovery.' 2 However, like traditional emotional distress
claims," courts are expanding the scope of impact or injury in fear of disease
cases to the point of doing away with the prerequisite altogether or only
requiring a de minimis showing,"
Although the test for recovery of cancerphobia differs from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, the general elements are as follows: (1) the defendant's culpable
conduct exposes the plaintiff to a disease-causing substance; (2) the plaintiff, in
turn, suffers mental or emotional distress in the form of fear of disease; and (3)
79. Hagertyv. L&LMarine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5thCir. 1986). See also Wisner
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 537 So. 2d 740 (La. App. Ist Cir 1989). Although the elements needed
to prove these actions arm similar, there are distinctions between these two causes of action.
Cancerphobia is a recognized illness, and expert medical testimony is needed to diagnose and prove
its "existence, cause, and extent." Edward J. Schoen et al., Could Cancerphobia Become a New
Plaintiffs'Medical Malpractice Gold Mine?, 12 No. I Health Span 8 at 9 (1995). On the other hand,
fear of future disease is mental anguish that results from the increased risk that an injury may lead
to disease in the future, and does not require expert testimony to establish. Id. "[T]he 'fear' aspect
is not something beyond the common knowledge of jurors." Id. (citing Brian R. Graves, Emotional
Distress Caused by Fear of Future Disease, 24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d § 3, at 285). Although
the distinction is hazy, an illustration can be seen in the following cases. In Ferrara v. Gallucchia,
5 N.Y.2d 16 (1958), the plaintiff succeeded by introducing expert testimony that she was suffering
from a "phobic apprehension" that she would develop cancer from a exposure to radiation. In
contrast, the plaintiff in Anderson v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc., 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974),
also suffered radiation bums. However, the expert only confirmed the plaintiff had an
increased risk of cancer, not that he had a fear of cancer. See also infra notes 123-149 and
accompanying text. Despite the distinction, these terms will be treated as the same throughout this
comment.
80. See. e.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A,2d 263, 266-67 (Pa. 1958).
81. The seminal decision of the physical impact rule, Victorian Railways Comm'rs v. Coultas,
13 A.C. 222 (1888), denied alleged damage to the plaintiff's nervous system because there was not
a physical injury claim as well.
82. See Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 528-29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Heber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437
N.E.2d 171, 180-81 (Mass. 1982); Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp., 701 P.2d 518, 524 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985); and Wetherill v. University of Chicago. 565 F. Supp 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
83. See Foumier J. Gale & James L. Goyer, Ill, Recoveryfor Cancerphobia and IncreasedfRisk
of Cancer, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 723 (1984). Fewer than 10 jurisdictions retain the physical impact rule
as such. Id. at 725 n.20.
84. Eric Fisher, Potter v. Firestone and the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 30 Tort & Ins. LJ.




the plaintiff's fear is reasonable."5 Some jurisdictions include a physical impact
requirement as the fourth element."
In the notable case of Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,8 7 the
California Supreme Court replaced the definition of "reasonableness" with a
more-likely-than-not standard, which one commentator calls "balancedand work-
able."" In Potter, Firestone deposited toxic waste at a landfill near the
plaintiffs, which in turn exposed the plaintiffs to carcinogens for a long period
of time. Although the plaintiffs did not have any physical effects from the
exposure, each faced an unquantified increased risk of future disease. 9 The
test, as established by the court, is as follows:
[T]he plaintiffs fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by
reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not the
plaintiff will develop the cancer in the future due to the toxic exposure.
Under this rule, a plaintiff must do more than simply establish ... a
significant increased risk of cancer. The plaintiff must further show
that based upon reliable medical or scientific opinion, the plaintiff
harbors a serious fear .... 90
In essence, the court did not look at the existence of a physical injury or impact
to curb claims, it looked at whether the plaintiffs could prove they would
actually develop cancer.9' This approach manages to strip all benefits from
recognizing fear of cancer as an injury.92 Now a plaintiff in California must
still face the difficult task of proving the defendant's conduct caused the latent
disease, and cannot be afforded the opportunity to merely prove causation for the
fear.
In support of the heightened criteria, the Potter majority set out several
policy arguments in favor of the more-likely-than-not standard. First, the
heightened criteria will curb the potential flood of litigation." Second, it will
provide adequate compensation for those plaintiffs who actually develop cancer,
thus lowering the chances of overcompensation. 9' Third, it establishes a
sufficient and definite threshold for recovery. 9 Last, it will "limit the class of
potential plaintiffs if emotional injury absent physical harm is to continue to be
85. Schoen, supra note 79, at 10.
86. Id.
87. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
88. Fisher, supra note 84, at 1072.
89. Potter, 863 P.2d at 801.
90. Id. at 816.
91. Love, supra note 56, at 808.
92. The major benefit of fear of cancer is that a plaintiff must only prove causation between
the defendant's negligent conduct and the plaintiffs fear, not the probability of future disease-as.
in a traditional tort claim. See supra notes 19-46 and accompanying text.
93. Potter, 863 P.2d at 812.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 813.
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a recoverable item of damages in a negligence action. ''" Although the court
has listed the reasons for a heightened standard for fear of cancer, forcing
plaintiffs to prove something other than their fear to be allowed damages for the
fear is illogical. It is as if the court is saying that a person must show the snake
bite in order to prove they were afraid of the snake.
Even though the Potter court's apprehension is justified, forcing plaintiffs
into an impossible standard is not a reasonable way to curb fraudulent claims.9"
As in other jurisdictions, the court should have implemented a physical impact
or injury requirement s and/or required an unquantified increased risk of
disease" to impede a potential flood of claims.'"
D. Medical Monitoring
Medical monitoring as a cause of action in a toxic tort case is a claim for
damages based on the cost of periodic medical examinations to detect latent
diseases caused by exposure to toxic substances.'' The main purposes of the
tort ' 2 are to allow early detection of disease and to mitigate future dam-
age." 3 To succeed in a medical monitoring action, plaintiffs must prove by the
96. Id.
97. In the recent case of Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997),
the Supreme Court denied damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress in an asbestos
exposure case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). While employed as a pipefitter
by the railroad, Buckley was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos for over three years.
After attending an asbestos "awareness class," Buckley feared he would develop cancer as a result
of his exposure. Furthermore, experts testified that Buckley had an increased risk of 1% to 5% that
he would develop cancer. Id. at 2116.
In an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court denied recovery holding that the physical impact
requirement was not satisfied by the mere exposure to a "substance that might cause a disease at a
substantially later time." Id. at 2117. Relying on policy reasons similar to the Potter court, the
* Court declined to expand the definition of "physical impact" without an accompanying injury. Id.
at 2119.
In a separate opinion by Justice Ginsburg, she said that Buckley's negligent infliction claim should
have failed because he "did not present objective evidence of severe emotional distress." Id. at 2124.
Essentially, she disagreed with the majority's blanket dismissal of negligent infliction damages for
asbestos exposure claims by excluding exposure from the definition of physical impact.
98. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
99. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987); Wisner v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R., 537 So. 2d 740 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988).
100. Love, supra note 56, at 808.
101. See Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569 (Cal. App. 5th 1993).
102. Most jurisdictions that recognize medical monitoring in toxic tort cases treat it as
independent harm. Allen T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the
Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 Ind. LJ. 849, 863 (1988). Other courts,
however, have allowed damages for future medical expenses and/or monitoring as an element of
damages. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986).




jurisdiction's standard of causation'04 that the exposure to toxic substances
caused the need for medical monitoring.' 0 5
Although it varies from case to case, courts look at the following elements
to determine whether or not to award medical monitoring damages: (1) the
significance of the plaintiff's exposure; (2) whether the exposure was to a proven
hazardous substance; (3) whether the plaintiff has an increased risk of a disease;
(4) the seriousness of the disease; and (5) the value of early detection and
treatment of the disease."° Although courts may apply similar elements, the
standards used in applying them fluctuate. For example, in Ayers, the court held
that an "unquantified" increased risk of disease was enough to award damag-
es,' but in Hansen, the standard for an increased risk of a disease was a
"probability of actually" developing the disease.'
Furthermore, as in fear of cancer cases, some courts have rejected the notion
that the plaintiff must suffer from an actual present physical injury as a
prerequisite to recover for medical monitoring." 9 One reason why these courts
do not require a present physical injury is because they view the injury as an
invasion of the right not to undergo medical monitoring."0 To illustrate, in
Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,"' the court posed the
following hypothetical to explain the medical monitoring tort:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike when Smith is riding through a
red light. Jones lands on his head with some force .... Jones enters
a hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests
to determine whether he has suffered any internal head injuries. The
tests prove negative, but Jones sues Smith... for ... the substantial
cost of the diagnostic examinations.. . . The motorbike rider, through
his negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the opinion of medical experts,
to need specific medical services . ..
104. Several standards have been used. See e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829, 850 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("probably necessary"); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312
(N.J. 1987) ("medically necessary"); and Miranda, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 ("reasonable medical
certainty").
105. In re Paoli R.R., 916 F.2d at 850.
106. See Miranda, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572; In re Paoli RR., 916 F.2d at 850; Ayers, 525 A.2d
at 312; and Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
107. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 313.
108. Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979.
109. See In re Paoli R.R., 916 F.2d at 851; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312-13; Redland Soccer Club,
Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 846 (3d Cir. 1995); and Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp.
869, 880 (W.D. Ohio 1994).
I 0. . Other reasons why courts do not require a present injury are varied. For example, in Bums
v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), the court simply followed a medical
expert's advice to award medical monitoring damages.
111. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
112. Id. at 825.
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In other words, "but for" the defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff would
not have incurred these medical expenses. " 3
There are, nevertheless, jurisdictions that still require a present physical
injury before a plaintiff may recover for medical monitoring. For example, in
Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc.," 4 a federal court applying West Virginia and
Virginia state law rejected a claim for medical monitoring damages because the
plaintiffs did not prove that they were suffering from a present injury, and the
court held that toxic exposure alone is not a physical injury.'"
Despite the variations on the different tests or standards between the
jurisdictions used to determine if medical monitoring damages are required, the
medical monitoring tort has become increasingly common in toxic tort cases." 6
This method of compensation has become popular because it "does not require
courts to speculate about the probability of future injury.""' Courts must only
determine the probability of the need for medical supervision."'
Another benefit of medical monitoring is that it satisfies a number of public
policy considerations. First, because this theory may provide a substantial
remedy before the consequences of the plaintiffs' exposure, it will have the
"beneficial effect of preventing or mitigating serious future illnesses and thus
reduce the overall costs to the responsible parties.""' Second, due to the
difficulty of proving liability since the disease does not manifest until years after
exposure, medical monitoring damages will serve a badly-needed deterrence to
polluters.' 0 Third, compensation for reasonable medical expenses is "consis-
tent with the important public health interest in fostering access to medical
testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced
risk of disease."'' 1
E. Increased Risk as the Harm
Another alternative for recovery of an increased risk of disease is to allow
recovery for the increased risk itself. By treating the increased risk as an
independent legal harm, damages are based on the notion that the defendant has
113. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
114. 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991).
115. In another case, Thomas v. FAG Berings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994), the
federal district court applying Missouri state law also rejected a medical monitoring claim due to a
lack of present injury. Citing Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), the court
held that a prerequisite for recovery of future damages is an actual present physical injury. Id. at
1410.
116. Melissa M. Thompson, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting Recovery
to Compensation for Loss. Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 453, 453 (1994).
117. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.. 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990).
118. Id.
119. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).




injured the plaintiff by merely increasing his or her risk to develop a disease.'22
Therefore, the plaintiff must only prove that the exposure increased his or her
risk of disease, not that a disease will more likely than not develop in the future.
In practice, courts have not allowed recovery for increased risk as such in
the toxic tort arena. Instead, the courts that have recognized an increased risk
of disease have done so only as an element of damages when applying the
traditional standard, and not recognized it as an independent harm.'" For
example, in Gideon v. Johns-Manville," the court allowed recovery for an
increased risk; however, this award was predicated on the facts that the plaintiff
suffered from asbestosis and an expert stated "[the plaintiff] will die of asbestos
disease, there's no doubt about it."' Thus, the plaintiff proved beyond the
jurisdiction's standard on the burden of persuasion that the ultimate harm,
"asbestos disease," will occur. As in Gideon, most jurisdictions that recognize
increased risk damages require the victim to prove that he has suffered a physical
injury and the future disease is "reasonably certain" or "reasonably probable" to
occur.12 6  Nonetheless, as noted previously,' the application of traditional
tort principles to increased risk of disease cases is "nothing but a phantom
remedy," due to the "current inchoate understanding of cancer and other...
diseases." 128
A line of cases in which the courts have begun to allow recovery for
increased risk is the "lost chance of survival" medical malpractice cases.'29 In
a lost chance case, the defendant, usually a doctor or hospital, is held liable if his
or her negligence contributed to the death of a patient; i.e., increased the risk of
death. 3° The reasons behind awarding these types of damages in malpractice
cases results from the fact that negligent physicians were being absolved from
liability when a patient's original chance of survival was less than fifty
percent,' and the difficulty in proving what actually caused the plaintiff's
injury, death, by a preponderance of the evidence." 2
122. Legum, supra note 8, at 576.
123. These increased risk cases are usually accompanied by a physical injury. See Petriello v.
Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); and
Wollen .v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992).
124. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
125. Id. at 1138.
126. Ashton, supra note 13, at 1083.
127. See supra text accompanying note 27.
128. Ashton, supra note 13, at 1084.
129. See Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983)
(Brachtenbach, J dissenting).
130. See John D. Hodson, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 A.L.R. 4th
10 (1995).
131. See Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992).




In both a lost chance of survival action and an increased risk of disease
action, the damage is the chance that a future event will occur. In a lost chance
claim, the event is survival; in an increased risk claim, the event is developing
a disease." Therefore, the damages should be based on how much the chance
has increased or decreased, not the ultimate harm that might be caused by the
negligence. This is because the interest that is being protected in both cases is
the freedom from the increased or decreased risk or chance.
. Even though these actions are basically the same, there are some justifica-
tions why lost chance should not be extended to increased risk of disease. One
reason is that plaintiffs can typically only recover for a lost chance when the
damage has occurred; i.e., he or she has died. 34 Additionally, courts have
argued that there are added public policy arguments for recognizing lost chance
in medical malpractice cases. 3 ' First, is the protection of the sanctity of the
doctor/patient relationship. 3 Second, if doctors are allowed to escape claims
due to a "statistically irrefutable loss," then the deterrence function will be
reduced. 37 Last, the difficulty in proving causation in medical malpractice
cases allows negligent health care providers to evade liability. 3 Because of
these policy reasons, some courts have limited the recovery of increased risk to
only medical malpractice cases, thus refusing to expand the theory to toxic torts
or other negligence actions.'39
Nevertheless, there are similar public policy arguments in favor of extending
the logic of the "lost chance" cause of action to increased risk of disease actions.
First, due to the fact that federal and state regulation alone cannot adequately
deter companies from polluting or exposing the public to hazardous substances,
an added tort liability will work in favor of deterring polluters."' Second,
allowing a recovery before the disease manifests itself will aid victims in
jurisdictions without a discovery rule, as well as those victims in a jurisdiction
with a discovery rule but the prescription period has begun due to a triggering
event, by allowing recovery for damages before the prescriptive period has run.
Third, if the plaintiff's increased risk of disease is proven to the extent that he
should be awarded medical monitoring damages, he should also be compensated
for this increase. Last, as noted previously, it is very difficult to prove "but for"
causation in a latent disease case, even if polluters were clearly negligent."'
133. In other words, lost chance of survival is the same as increased risk of death.
134. This is not always the case. In Claudet v. Weyrich, 6§2 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1995), the plaintiff was allowed to recover for a lost chance even though she did not die. See Infra
notes 222-224 and accompanying text.
135. Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1996).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1028.
138. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc,, 741 P.2d 467, 474 (Okla. 1987).
139. Id.
140. Love, supra note 56, at 801.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 19-46.
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Recognizing the increased risk as the injury will alleviate many of the causation
difficulties.
There are, of course, problems with treating an increased risk of disease as
an independent legal harm. Foremost, is the uncertainty of damages. In
Ayers,' Justice Handler addresses the uncertainty of damages issue in his
dissenting opinion. He said:
There are relatively few injuries that can be easily or logically
quantified. It is not merely the relatively new tort claims like "pain and
suffering" and "emotional distress" that are difficult to quantify. What
is the logical method of evaluation for compensating a claim of trespass
on land, the battery of unconsented-to surgery, a violation of personal
privacy, or an insult to character?'
The majority points out, however, that although what Handler said is true, "such
damages are awarded on the basis of events that have occurred and can be
proved at the time of trial.... [An] enhanced risk claim depends upon the
likelihood of an event that has not yet occurred."'" Nevertheless, the majority
is incorrect when it states that the "event ... has not yet occurred."'45 The
event has occurred. The plaintiff's increased risk began at the initial exposure
to the toxic substance and continues throughout his or her life. Therefore, the
fact that the disease may or may not actually occur in the future is relatively
unimportant; the important fact is whether the plaintiff has an increased risk to
develop a disease in the future.
Another argument against allowing recovery for an increased risk of disease
is that it will open the "floodgates" of litigation." 6 Because of the costs
associated with expert testimony, which is needed to prove causation, increased
risk cases are expensive to litigate." 7 Thus, the expense of litigation may be
enough to curb fallacious claims. Besides, a defendant whose risk was not
significantly increased would have little incentive to bear the costs of litigation
when recovery would be modest at best." At any rate, courts "should not
allow speculative fears or undifferentiated anxiety over a possible rush of
litigation to defeat a sound and fair cause of action."" 9
142.' Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
143. Id. at 320.
144. Id. at 308.
.145. Id.
146. Id. at 307.
147. In mass exposure cases, class actions may be a way of minimizing individual costs. Diane
Schmauder, An Analysis of New Jersey's Increased Risk Doctrine, 25 Rutgers L.J. 893, 930 (1-994):
Therefore, risk creators are forced to internalize the costs of theirrisk-creating activity. See William
Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 268 (1987).
148. Schmauder, supra note 147, at 930
149. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 319 (N.J. 1987).
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IV. THE PREVALENCE OF DISEASE IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, approximately thirty percent of the population will develop
cancer at some time in their lives."0 This rate exceeds not only the southern
averages, but also the national averages.' Although the origins of the disease
may vary from person to person, there is evidence that shows that certain
chemicals, such as chlorinated compounds, may be the source of these and other
health effects in humans."2 Taking this into account, the companies that
produce these chemicals should have the duty to exercise due care when using
or producing these toxic substances.
As mentioned before, one way to ensure companies exercise due care in
handling these chemicals is to allow recovery to plaintiffs harmed by exposure
to these chemicals. Whether it be for medical costs to detect diseases early or
some other potential liability, the effect will encourage companies to exercise the
appropriate levels of care.'"
V. LOUISIANA'S ATTEMPTS AT SOLVING THE PROBLEMS WITH INCREASED
RISK
A. The Discovery Rule
In Louisiana, prescription in tort cases is governed by Louisiana Civil Code
article 3492. The article states that prescription in delictual actions "commences
to run from the day injury or damage is sustained." Although a clear reading of
the article may not seem to allow for a discovery rule, the doctrine of contra non
valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio was jurisprudentially adopted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court." Roughly translated, contra non means that
prescription does not run against a party who is unable to act.
There are several different categories of contra non that will suspend the
running of prescription. The category that is similar to the discovery rule is that
prescription is suspended because the cause of action is not "known or reasonably
knowable" by the plaintiff.' 5 However, this category of the doctrine will not
suspend prescription if the plaintiff's ignorance is "attributable to his own
150. Environment and Health in Louisiana: The Cancer Problem, Report of the Governor's Task
Force on Environmental Health 144 (1984).
151. Id.
152. Bette Hileman, Concerns Broaden Over Chlorine and Chlorinated Hydrocarbons, Chem
& Eng. News II (Apr. 19, 1993).
153. See Love, supra note 56. Love uses the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India as an
example: In the Bhopal plant, "Union Carbide made no effort to update the plant facilities, provide
adequate training to employees, develop emergency plans, or inform the public about possible risks."
Id. at 793. Because the tort system is undeveloped in India, "the potential liability failed to provide
incentives for Union Carbide to take appropriate safety steps to prevent mass disaster." Id. at 794.
154. See Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
155. Id. at 1321-22.
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willfulness or neglect.""Is 6 Thus, the application of this doctrine leads to the
same results as the discovery rule would.
B. Splitting the Split Cause of Action
In 1990, the Louisiana Legislature passed Senate Bill 639 that provided not
only for the expansion of the general res judicata rules, but also for some limited
exceptions. The act added Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425'
and amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231" s to provide that when a
"second action asserts a cause of action which arises out of the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the first action," the second action will
be barred." 9 Before the changes, "a second action would be barred by the
defense of res judicata only when the plaintiff seeks the same relief based on the
same cause or grounds.""Is The reasoning behind the change was to promote
"judicial economy and fairness." ''
The act also added Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232 which allows for
some exceptions to the general rules found in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 425 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231. Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:4232 states:
A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:
(1) When exceptional circumstancesjustify relief from the res
judicata effect of the judgment;
(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without
prejudice; or
(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to
bring another action.
156. Id.
157. "A party shall assert all causes of action arising'out of the transaction or occurrence that.
is the subject matter of the litigation." La. Code Civ. P. art. 425.
158. La. R.S. 13:4231 (1991) states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between
the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(I) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time
of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the litigation are extinguished and merged into the judgment;
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the
time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on
those causes of action;
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any
subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.





The comment to the act states:
[The act] gives the court the authority to reserve in the judgment the
right of the plaintiff to bring a subsequent action .... It could... be
useful in cases where the plaintiff may be unsure whether he will suffer
future injuries from the event which he is presently litigating, e.g., risk
of contracting cancer from exposure to asbestos.'62
This comment evinces the legislature's intent to allow plaintiffs to split a cause
of action in an increased risk case with authority from the court.
C. Fear of Future Disease
The seminal case for recognizing fear of cancer or disease in Louisiana is
Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc. 6 3 In the case, Mr. Anderson
suffered radiation burns from handling a radioactive "pill" negligently left on his
premises by the defendant.'" Included in his litany of claims was a prayer for
"anxiety and mental anguish" for the possibility of cancer.' A doctor testified
that cancer may result from this occurrence, but this was not too "probable
because plaintiff did not have repeated exposures."'" In allowing damages for
anxiety and mental anguish, the court stated:
While to a scientist in his ivory tower the possibility of cancerous
growth may be so minimal as to be untroubling, we are not prepared to
hold that the trier of fact erred in finding compensable this real
possibility to this worrying workman, faced every minute of his life
with a disabled and sometimes painful hand to remind him of his
fear. 167
Although the Anderson court recognized the cause of action, it did not
establish any workable standard for allowing recovery for fear of disease or
cancer. A workable standard for allowing recovery was not established until
Hagerty v. L & L Marine Service, Inc.16' Despite that this was a Jones Act
case, several cases applying Louisiana law have cited Hagerty with approval.' 69
In Hagerty, the plaintiff was "completely drenched with dripolene, a chemical
containing benzene.. ." on one occasion and "sprayed again" on another. 70
"[Hie suffered a brief period of dizziness, followed by leg cramps until he
162. Id.
163. 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974).
164. Id. at 352.
165. Id. at 353.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
169. See cases cited in infra note 175.
170. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 317.
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obtained his shower."' 7' Hagerty sued for increased risk of cancer, fear of
cancer, as well as other causes of action.
In setting out the elements for fear of cancer, the court thoroughly discussed
the physical injury requirement. Even though the court recognized that the
purpose of the physical injury rule is to curb fraudulent claims, it said that the
notion was "unrealistic," and that a plaintiff can recover for fear of cancer with or
without a physical injury.7 7 This portion of the opinion, however, was modified
on rehearing to require an actionable injury before averring a fear of cancer
claim.'" Therefore, the elements as established by Hagerty are: (1) a fear that
is causally related to the defendant's negligence; (2) a fear that is reasonable; and
(3) an actionable injury. 74 Since Hagerty, it seems that these elements are what
courts follow in toxic tort medical monitoring cases in Louisiana today.'"
D. Medical Monitoring
Unlike fear of cancer, the Louisiana Supreme Court has been silent on the
issue of medical monitoring. Moreover, even though there are few lower court
opinions discussing the issue, these opinions merely gloss over the topic. In
Jeffery v. Thibaut Oil Co.,' 76 the plaintiff sued for damages after being doused
with gasoline. While pumping gas, the hose broke spraying it into the plaintiff's
eyes.' The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants
appealed the court's award of future medical expenses and loss of future earnings.
In allowing the trial verdict to stand, the court of appeal stated that the
plaintiff "has a high probability of developing a serious physical disease in the
future. . . [which] will require medical treatment."'78 The court based its
finding on the testimony of the plaintiff's experts that stated "gasoline exposure
creates a greater risk of cancer since Benzene is one of its components and has
been linked to leukemia."' 79  Thus, the court allowed recovery for future
medical expenses based on the expert testimony on the increased risk of cancer.
171. id.
172. Id. at 318.
173. Id. at 256.
174. Id. at318. See also Easson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., No. 89-0188, 1991 WL 168640 (E.D.
La. July 16, 1991).
175. See Smith v. A.C. & S Inc., 843 F.2d 854, 858 (5th Cit. 1988) (citing Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Sere., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cit. 1986) with approval); Coffin v. Board of Supervisors of
LSU, 620 So. 2d 1354, 1364 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1993) (citing Hagerty with approval); Johnson v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp. 764,769 (W.D. La. 1986) (citing Hagerty with approval); Wisner
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 537 So. 2d 740 (La. App. lst'Cir. 1988) (citing Anderson and allowed
increased risk testimony to prove reasonableness of fear); Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783
F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cit. 1986) (citing Anderson and requiring a physical injury); and Harper v. Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1141 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Adams as requiring a physical injury)..
176. 652 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 5th Cit. .1995).
177. Id. at 1022.
178. Id. at 1025.
179. Id. at 1023.
[Vol. 58
COMMENTS
Another case, Manuel v. Shell Oil Co., 0 is similar to Jeffery with a similar
result. The plaintiff in Manuel was also exposed to a substance with benzene, and
the trial court allowed recovery for "Future Medical Monitoring."' The court
of appeal found "that the trial judge was not manifestly erroneous in relying on the
testimony of plaintiffs experts""' 2 who testified to the effect that the "plaintiff
must be monitored regularly" 1 3 for cancer.
Even though these cases recognize that medical monitoring damages can be
awarded, it is unclear if they stand for the fact that medical monitoring is an
independent legal harm or merely an element of damages. In both cases, it
seems that the courts only followed the experts' testimonial advice in allowing
the damages.
Like the state courts, Hagerty also allowed future medical expenses without
much of an analysis. The court stated, "[a] plaintiff ordinarily may recover
reasonable medical expenses, past and future, which he incurs as a result of a
demonstrated injury."' " The injury in this case was dizziness and leg cramps.
In Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., a the federal district court said that medical
monitoring damages are recoverable, but once again, did not articulate any
definite standard for recovery. Quoting Hagerty, the court stated if the damages
are "medically advisable," then they can be recovered."
Although the case law on this issue is unclear, the courts apparently allow
recovery if the plaintiff can sufficiently prove that he or she has an increased risk
of cancer along with a present physical injury, as done in the Hagerty court." 7
Therefore, as long as a plaintiff has a physical injury and can prove an increased
risk-not that the disease will develop in the future-then some type of medical
monitoring damages should be awarded.
E. Increased Risk as the Harm
Unfortunately, as with medical monitoring, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
been silent on the issue of increased risk of disease. Even when confronted with
a certification of the issue from the United States Fifth Circuit,"' s the supreme
court denied certification." 9
180. 664 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
181. Id. at 473.
182. Id. at 483.
183. Id. at 479.
184. Hagerty v. L &.L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986).
185. 645 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La. 1986).
186. Id. at 769.
187. Id.
188. Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 1068, 1069 (5th Cir. 1985). The question
certified was: "Whether Louisiana law permits a plaintiff in a products liability action to recover
damages for an increased risk of contracting cancer in the future in the absence of any evidence that
the plaintiff currently has cancer or, within reasonable medical probability, will contract cancer in
the future."
189. Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 467 So. 2d 529 (La. 1985).
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One of the first Louisiana cases dealing with increased risk of damage is
Bartholomew v. Impastato.'" In the case, a child fell due to a damaged
balustrade, 9' suffering severe injuries to the head. Two doctors testified that
the child "might develop" convulsions in the future. The court stated that
the future injuries were too speculative to warrant damages for future injuries.
Afeman v. Insurance Co. of North America,"3 is another case in which a
plaintiff was trying to prove his increased risk would lead to damage. In
Afeman, the plaintiff fell through a ceiling and broke his wrists. A portion of his
claim for damages was the possibility that he may develop arthritis due to the
damage to his wrists. The court denied the claim stating, "[a]wards should not
be given based upon speculation that a fifty-one year old man may develop
arthritis in later years.""
In Berry v. City of Monroe,9s the plaintiff was injured while running
through a nocturnal exhibit at the zoo when she collided with a support column
damaging her left eye and surrounding soft tissue. Months after the incident, she
suffered epileptic seizures caused by the collision, which were treated by
medication. Although she did not suffer any more seizures after beginning the
medication treatment, she prayed for recovery based on the possibility of future
seizures. The court said, "mere speculation of such an event cannot provide the
basis for an award." 6
These decisions evince the basic principle that recovery for future damage
in Louisiana will not be allowed unless the future damage is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Horton v. Valley Electric Membership Corp. "' was one of the first cases
in which the plaintiff attempted to stretch the theory from increased risk of
damage from disease. When Horton was lifting his metal deer stand out of his
truck, it came into contact with the defendant's power lines, causing damages
which included a third degree burn on the plaintiff's left foot. The court stated,
"plaintiff has some increased risk of skin cancer at the graft site.""'  Although
the opinion is unclear on the issue, the court apparently included the increased
risk of cancer when calculating the general damages.
In Wisner v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad,'" the first circuit was con-
fronted with the issue of whether to allow recovery for the increased risk of
cancer. In Wisner, the defendant complained that the trial court erred in
190. 12 So. 2d 700 (La. App. Or. 1943).
191. A row of "vase-shaped" supports for a rail.
192. Bartholomew, 12 So. 2d at 707.
193. 307 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
194. Id. at 403.
195. 439 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
196. Id. at 468.
197. 461 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cr. 1984).
198. Id. at 381.
199. 537 So. 2d 740 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988).
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allowing testimony of increased risk of cancer. The court of appeal stated, "the
evidence of increased risk of cancer is relevant to the issue of ... fear of
cancer."2°e The court went on to explain:
The defendant further complains that the prejudicial effect of
allowing the testimony could have been reduced by the following jury
instruction: "Louisiana law does not allow recovery for an increased
risk of cancer. Should plaintiff contract cancer at a later date he will
be able to recover at that time if he can prove that cancer was caused
by the defendant's conduct."
The instruction given by the trial court is as follows: "[Il]ike other
parts of the plaintiff's case, these damages must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. This means, on the one hand, that
you're not entitled to award speculative damages for the injuries which
you think the plaintiff might have suffered, or might suffer in the
future."
This court is of the opinion the instruction given by the trial court
adequately reflects the law. However, even were this court to conclude
the defendant's instruction should have been given, we do not believe
the error would justify a trial de novo .... 201
Many inferences can be made from the court's language. One could conclude
that: (1) Louisiana does not allow recovery for an increased risk; (2) Louisiana
is identical to many other jurisdictions that do not allow future damages unless
they can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence; or (3) Louisiana allows
splitting a cause of action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also encoun-
tered cases dealing with increased risk of disease in which Louisiana law was to
be applied. In Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,20' the plaintiff sought to
recover for increased risk of cancer and fear of developing cancer due to the
exposure to asbestos manufactured by the defendant. On rehearing, the court
denied recovery because Adams did not present sufficient evidence that he had
cancer or would develop cancer within a reasonable probability.203 In exclud-
ing Adams' expert testimony on his increased risk, the trial court stated:
Plaintiff Adams does not now have cancer and by whatever definition
plaintiff wishes to use, any reference that he may or might have cancer
in the future is only a possibility. There can be no causal link with an
injury when that injury hasn't yet occurred so... I stand by the ruling
200. Id. at 748. An increased risk of cancer tends to show the reasonableness of the plaintif's
fear of cancer.
201. Id. at 749.
202. 727 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1984).
203. Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1986).
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I made at the pretrial conference that no evidence regarding cancer will
be submitted to this jury. ..04
On appeal Adams' proffer consisted of "abstract statistics and generalizations,"
which the court of appeals held to be insufficient "to demonstrate that the
decision of the trial court to exclude evidence of cancer was an abuse of
discretion," as well as insufficient in proving that "he suffered any percentage of
disablement from inhalation of asbestos fibers which would establish the probable
risk of cancer." '°
In addressing the issue of increased risk in Hagerty, the Fifth Circuit held:
"[w]e conclude that a plaintiff can recover only where he can show that the toxic
exposure more probably than not will lead to cancer."2 Because he did not
allege that he will probably develop cancer in the future, the court denied the
claim for recovery for an increased risk.
Smith v. A. C. & S. Inc.2°) was an asbestos case in which the plaintiff was
seeking recovery for cancerphobia. In discussing the burden of proof of
establishing a cancerphobia cause of action, the court said:
It is important to note that a plaintiff, to recover for fear of cancer,
need not prove that his toxic exposure will more probably than not lead
to cancer. This is the burden of proof which a plaintiff must satisfy to
recover for the increased risk of cancer.208
These federal court cases seem to agree With the state courts' ruling on the
questions of proof-the plaintiff must prove the chance of the future ailment by
a preponderance of the evidence.
As opposed to increased risk of disease, a line of cases that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has developed is the "lost chance" of survival cases.2
Louisiana is one of many jurisdictions that has allowed recovery for "lost
chance." 2 0 The seminal case that allowed recovery is Hastings v. Baton Rouge
General Hospital."' In the case, the surviving parents of Cedric Paul Hastings
brought a malpractice suit against the defendants. Cedric had several stab
wounds and weak vital signs when admitted for care at Baton Rouge General.
204. Id. at 591.
205. Id. at 592.
206. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986).
207. 843 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1988).
208. Id. at 859. See also Johnson v. Armstrong Co., 645 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La. 1986). The
court set out the following rules to determine if evidence is to be allowed in increased risk of disease
cases: "(Elvidence concerning the increased risk of contracting cancer in the future will be
admissible where the plaintiff 'can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to
cancer."' Id. at 769 (quoting Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319).
209. See Dionne R. Carney, Note, Smith v. State of Louisiana, Department of Health and
Hospitals: Loss Chance of Survival: The Valuation Debate, 58 La. L. Rev. 339 (1997).
210. See Hodson, supra note 130.
211. 498 So. 2d 713 (La. 1986).
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After the doctors stabilized him, they then prepared to move him to another
hospital due to his lack of medical insurance. When the defendants attempted
to transport him,'his condition deteriorated.dramatically and proved to be fatal.
When evaluating the cause of Cedric's death, the Supreme Court stated:
Despite the fact that the wounds were one cause in fact of Cedric's
death, there can be more than one cause in fact making both wrongdoers
liable .... Once a breach of duty constituting malpractice is estab-
lished, the question of whether the malpractice contributed to the death,
i.e., lessened the chance of survival is a question of fact for the
jury.... A substantial factor need not be the only causative factor; it
need only increase the risk of harm. 2
Thus, the court allowed recovery for the lost chance of survival (increased risk
of death) even though this chance did not necessarily prove to be greater than
fifty percent. Thus, recovery will be allowed as long as the doctor's malpractice
increased the risk of harm.
After Hastings, the issue of "lost chance" came before the supreme court
several times, almost always within the confines of medical malpractice
actions." 3 In the most recent case on "lost chance," Smith v. State Hospi-
tals,2  the Louisiana Supreme Court set out to address the method of valuation
of the damages recoverable for the lost chance of survival. In answering the
question, however, the court may have implied that it will limit the application
of "lost chance" to medical malpractice cases, and not expand the analysis to an
ordinary negligence action. In footnote 7, the court stated: "This decision only
addresses damages in a medical malpractice case and does not consider damages
for loss of a chance of survival in cases against other types of tortfeasors. See
Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co."' . . . That decision is left for another
day."2  In the Hardy case cited by the court, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified the following question to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court: "Does the lost chance of survival doctrine. .. . apply
in an ordinary negligence case that is not brought against a medical practitioner
or hospital?" '217 The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the question in the
negative. The court set out the public policy behind allowing recovery for lost
chance in medical malpractice actions by stating:
212. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
213. See Smith v. State Dept. of Health and Human Resources Admin., 523 So. 2d 815 (La.
1988); Martin v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 582 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1991); and Ambrose v. New
Orleans Police Dept. Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216 (La. 1994).
214. 676 So. 2d 543 (La. 1996).
215. 910 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1996).
216. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 547 n.7.
217. Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Okla. 1996).
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The public policy considerations which are reflected in the judicial
decisions creating this remarkable exception to the traditional rule of the
standard of proof of causation focus on the special relationship of the
physician and patient and the expression of apprehension that failure to
adopt the loss of chance doctrine in medical malpractice suits would
place patients with preexisting conditions in peril.2"
The court then went on to state that allowing the extension of lost chance
to mere negligence cases "would cause a fundamental redefinition of the meaning
of causation in tort law."2 9 Thus, the distinction drawn by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court between medical malpractice and mere negligence actions is one
of policy.
By citing Hardy in footnote 7, the Louisiana Supreme Court may be hinting
that it agrees with the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the lost chance of survival
is limited to medical malpractice. On the other hand, it is possible that the
supreme court may allow another exception to the traditional rule of the standard
of proof for increased risk of disease. As noted previously, some of the public
policy arguments in favor of recognizing "lost chance" also apply to increased
risk of disease. For instance, the lack of deterrence.2 . and problems with
causation are the two policies that apply to both increased risk of disease cases
and "lost chance" cases.22'
There are problems with extending "lost chance" to increased risk. The first
problem is that "lost chance" cases are usually only actionable when the patient
has died. In Claudet v. Weyrich, 2  however, the fourth circuit court of appeal
allowed recovery for a lost chance when the plaintiff survived. In Claudet, the
plaintiff visited Dr. Weyrich on a number of occasions. On a particular
occasion, the doctor detected a lump in the plaintiff's breast, which the doctor
did not believe was cancer. Although Ms. Claudet expressed concern about the
lump on several occasions, Dr. Weyrich "felt there was no cause for alarm."
Ultimately, the lump was diagnosed as cancer.
At trial, expert medical testimony focused on the increased risk of death
resulting from the late diagnosis. According to the experts, because the cancer
was not treated at the time Dr. Weyrich found the lump, the delay caused Ms.
Claudet a thirty-three percent increased chance of dying."'3 Based on the
218. Id. at 1028.
219. Id. at 1030.
220. The need for deterring negligent handling of hazardous chemicals has been amplified due
to the legislature's repeal of La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3.
221. See supra notes 129-141 and accompanying text.
222. 662 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
223. When Dr. Wcyrich discovered the lump, the cancer was in Stage 1. However, the cancer
was subsequently diagnosed and removed at Stage 11. The survival rate of cancer at Stage I is 75%,
and at Stage I1 is 42%; with a difference of 33%. Id. at 132.
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testimony, the court allowed the jury to compensate the plaintiff for her increased
risk of death.
In discussing the point that Ms. Claudet had survived the experience, the
court said, "[t]he fact that Ms. Claudet's present chances of survival are
improved... does not reduce her past suffering."2"4 Therefore, even though
the increased risk did not ultimately lead to death, recovery was still allowed.
Extending the court's logic in Claudet to an increased risk of disease action,
recovery should be allowed because the risk itself should be considered the
damage, even though the ultimate harm has not appeared; i.e., the disease has not
developed.
The second problem with extending lost chance to increasedrisk is that it will
result in an overhaul in the causation analysis. 225 In other words, instead of
having to prove actual damage, the plaintiff will only have to prove that his or her
chances for damage were increased. By citing Hardy in Smith v. State Department
of Health and Hospitals,22 the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to imply that
it may agree with this argument and limit lost chance to medical malpractice.
Nevertheless, the supreme court has recently expanded lost chance to the
wrongful death action against an employer in Weber v. State.2"7 Weber suffered
from an occupational disease which required a heart transplant. His employer, the
State of Louisiana, refused to authorize the transplant. Weber subsequently
brought the matter to the Office of Workers Compensation, and it recommended
that the state pay all expenses. Once again, the state refused to authorize payment.
Mr. Weber died before his attorney could seek judicial intervention.
The state argued that the remedy for refusing to provide necessary medical
treatment is provided in the Worker's Compensation Act, and suits based on non-
intentional conduct of the employer are thereby barred.2 8 The plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argued that the intentional refusal to provide medical treatment
allowed suit under the statute because it increased the chance of Mr. Weber's
death.
In what the court called "a narrow exception to the general rule that penalties
and attorney's fees are the exclusive remedy for the employers misconduct in
handling compensation claims," the court specifically held:
[T]he State's alleged conduct in intentionally and arbitrarily denying
necessary medical expenses, . . . may result in liability beyond the
remedies provided in the Workers Compensation Act, when the ...
employer knew to a substantial certainty that denial would cause death
that would not otherwise have occurred. '29
224. Id. at 133.
225. See Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Okla. 1996).
226. See supra note 216.
227. 635 So. 2d 188 (La. 1994).
228. Id. at 192.
229. Id. at 193.
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In essence, the court allowed the plaintiffs to recover for the "lost chance"
resulting from the state's denial of medical treatment. Weber is evidence that the
court is willing to extend the "lost chance" theory.
VI. FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION
As seen, there are many possible routes a plaintiff can take to recover for an
increased risk case in Louisiana. The plaintiff can wait to sue for disease by
splitting the cause of action and using the discovery rule, or recover for some
type of medical monitoring damages. The unanswered questions, however, are
whether a plaintiff can recover for medical monitoring or an increased risk of
disease as independent legal harms, as is currently done in "lost chance" cases.
Although the "lost chance" cases can potentially be extended to award damages
for an increased risk of disease, this will not occur until the courts agree with the
policy reasons behind recognizing recovery for these claims.
The recognition of "new" causes of action is not foreign to Louisiana. The
same phenomenon occurred when the courts recognized recovery for bystander
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Like increased risk, bystander
negligent infliction was initially met with the arguments that mental disturbance
cannot be measured monetarily, its physical consequences are too remote,30
and recognition will cause a vast increase in litigation.23" ' Nevertheless, the
courts began to allow recovery for this action. Initially, bystander negligent
infliction damages were allowed only when accompaniedby a physical injury or
if the claimant was in the zone of danger. Next, the courts began to allow
negligent infliction damages to bystanders for certain types of situations, which
included the mishandling of corpses and viewing an injury of someone to which
the claimant was closely related. 2
A similar evolution is now occurring with increased risk cases. Presently,
a plaintiff in Louisiana can recover for increased risk of death (lost chance) and
possibly for increasedrisk of disease and medical monitoring when accompanied
with an injury.1" The next step may be to allow recovery for these claims in
other situations, as done with bystander negligent infliction.
Ultimately, these questions will remain unanswered until the Louisiana
courts begin addressing these difficult issues rather than evading them.
Keith W. Lapeze
230. They are not proximately caused.
231. Keeton et al., supra note 14, at 360.
232. See Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990) and La. Civ. Code art.
2315.6. See also Moresi v. State Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990), reh 'g
denied.
233. Horton v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 461 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
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